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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
923. The instant case could have followed the reasoning of In re Tatham's
Esate (1915) 250 Pa. 269, 95 Atl. 520, in which damages paid to the
executors in trust for realty condemned during the widow's lifetime was
held to be distributable as realty, and not as personalty.
The court also failed to consider the doctrine of reconversion, which is
an imaginary process by which a constructive conversion is countermanded
and the converted property restored to its original status in the contempla-
tion of the law, at the election of the parties entitled to the property, or by
operation of law. Bishpam, Principles of Equity, supra; Chandler, Recon-
version in Missouri, 12 St. L. L. Rev. 175 et seq. Although the gen-
eral rule under the doctrine is that all of those having a beneficial interest
in the property converted must consent to a reconversion (Wyatt V. Still-
man Institute [1924] 303 Mo. 94, 260 S. W. 73), it has been held that
where the direction is for a conversion of money (as for example, the
award) into realty (to which the right of dower would unquestionably at-
tach) only one of the beneficiaries need elect to reconvert as to her share.
Seely v. Jago (1717) 1 P. Wins. 389, 24 Eng. Rep. 438. The New York
court could have reached a more equitable decision by following Nall V. Nall
(1912) 243 Mo. 247, 147 S. W. 1006, and Griffith v. Witten (1913) 252 Mo.
627, 161 S. W. 708, to the effect that at the option of the beneficiary, prop-
erty which became money as a result of the conversion may be regarded as
realty.
Since it is the policy of the law to protect dower at all hazards, the in-
choate right should be preserved under the circumstances of the principal
case as well as otherwise. The contrary view should be confined to con-
troversies between the state and the wife of one whose property is con-
demned; for the reason behind the rule vanishes when the question arises
as between the parties to the marriage in connection with the fund which
is the substitute for the real property taken. Young and Carswell J. J.,
dissenting in the principal case. The better view would appear to be for
the court to order that one-third of the total award be deposited in trust
for the wife contingent on her surviving the husband, with the annual in-
come of the fund going to the husband.
W. F. '37.
EQUITY-INJuNcTIONs-LBEL.-Counterclaim by defendants alleging
that complainant and its servants and agents made false statements as
to the quality of its products and that complainant circulated false state-
ments concerning defendant corporation intending to injure the defendants
in business and to deceive the public and the defendants' customers. Held:
Counterclaim dismissed. The Court of Chancery is without jurisdiction
to restrain injury to business or property threatened by false representa-
tion as to character, quality, or title of property, nor does its jurisdiction
extend to cases of libel or slander. A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Jos. Hol-
lander, Inc., (N. J. Eq. 1935) 177 At. 80.
That equity will not restrain by injunction the threatened publication of
a libel, as such, however great the injury to property may appear to be,
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has been the universal rule in the United States, and was formerly the rule
in England. The present rule in England rests on statute, Common Law
Procedure Act of 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125 sec. 78, 81, 82; Judicature Act
of 1873 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66 see. 16; for conflicting view see Pound, Equit-
able Relief Against Defamation, (1916) 29 Harvard L. Rev. 665. In most
cases of threatened tort to property interests preventive relief is now avail-
able, In re Debs (1884) 158 U. S. 564; Beck v. Teamsters' Union (1898)
118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13; Shoe Co. it. Saxey (1895) 131 Mo. 212, 32 S. W.
1106, yet where unrestrained publication may cause irreparable injury, and
where legal remedy is totally inadequate, equity denies relief.
The decisions are usually based on one of the following grounds: that
the constitutional guarantee of free speech and free publication absolutely
precludes an injunction against speaking and writing under any circum-
stances; Heat and P. Co. v. Montgomery (C. C. N. D. Ala., 1909) 171 Fed.
553; Brandreth v. Lance (1839) 8 Paige 24; Marlin Fire Arms Co. V. Shield
(1902) 171 N. Y. 38, 64 N. E. 163; Mann i. Raimist (1931) 255 N. Y. 307,
174 N. E. 690; that the issue as to the truth of the publication sought to be
enjoined should be tried by a jury; Fleming v. Newton (1848) 1 H. L. Cas.
363; Pound, (1916) 29 Harvard L. Rev. 640, 656. The majority of the
cases, however, are decided simply on the authority of previous decisions
without any attempt at rationalization. Prudencial Assurance Co. it. Knott
(1874) 10 Ch. App. 142; Balliet v. Cassidy (C. C. D. Ore., 1900) 104 Fed.
704; Vassar College v. Loose Wiles Biscuit Co. (D. C. W. D. Mo., 1912) 197
Fed. 982; De Wick v. Dobson (1897) 46 N. Y. Supp. 390; Butterick Pub.
Co. v. Typographical Union (1906) 100 N. Y. Supp. 292. The present case
was decided upon the basis of prior authority, following the ruling laid
down in Prudencial Assurance Co. v. Knott, supra, and Kidd v. Horry (C. C.
E. D. Pa., 1886) 28 Fed. 773, that if the statements do not amount to a libel
they are innocuous and justifiable in the eye of a Court of Common Law,
and if they are libelous it is clearly settled that the Court of Chancery has
no jurisdiction to restrain them.
Although pen service is still paid to the rule, a growing body of cases
has established several exceptions or qualifications to the rule. It is now
generally recognized that charges of invalidity of a trader's patents and
threats to sue his customers, when made under circumstances showing that
there is no real intent to bring suit, will be enjoined. Emack v. Kane (C. C.
N. D. Ill., 1888) 34 Fed. 46; Farquhar Co. v. National Harrow Co., (C. C. A.
3, 1900) 102 Fed. 714; Adriance, Platt & Co. vL. National Harrow Co. (C. C.
A. 2, 1903) 121 Fed. 827; Racine Paper Goods Co. v. Dittgen (C. C. A. 7,
1909) 171 Fed. 631; Sun Maid Raisin Growers v. Avis (D. C. E. D. Ill.,
1928) 25 Fed. (2nd) 303. Again, libelous statements, coupled with advice
to customers to break contracts, have been enjoined, although conceivably
only the portion relating to the breach of the contract might have been re-
strained. American Malting Co. v. Keitel (C. C. A. 2, 1913) 209 Fed. 351;
Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co.
(C. C. N. D. Ala., 1909) 171 Fed. 553. Still another line of cases stands for
the proposition that where a party to a trade dispute has published to cus-
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tomers of another or to the trade generally an account of a court proceeding
which is misleading, the continuance of such practice may be enjoined.
Asbestos Shingle Co. v. Johns-Manville Co. (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 1911) 189 Fed.
611; Rollman Mfg. Co. v. Universal Hardware Works (C. C. A. 3, 1916)
238 Fed. 568; Gerosa v. Apeo Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 1, 1924) 299 Fed. 19;
Price Hollister Co. v. Warlord Corporation (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1926) 18
Fed. (2nd) 129; Haver Co. v. Sesquicentennial Exhibition Association (D. C.
E. D. Pa., 1928) 26 Fed. (2nd) 821; Gardner Sign Co. v. Claude Neon Lights,
Inc. (D. C. W. D. Pa., 1929) 36 Fed. (2nd) 827. The courts in creating these
exceptions based their decisions on a tenuous property interest in the com-
plainants.
Two recent cases, Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1929)
35 Fed. (2nd) 403 and Dehydro Inc. v. Tr'eotlite Co. (D. C. N. D. Okla.,
1931) 53 Fed. (2nd) 273, held that such actions as these are not actions to
enjoin a libel or slander but rather to enjoin a party from committing acts
constituting unfair competition, and from destroying the plaintiff's business.
See Walsh, On Equity, 267. The principal case could have been decided
along the same lines. By not doing so the Court seems to be out of line with
the modern tendency.
The exceptions tend to show that the courts are not in sympathy with
the alleged rule "equity will not enjoin a libel" and they are willing to
bring about the opposite result by indirect means. The courts have still
failed to take the direct course because of precedent.
0. J. G. '37.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION-EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE ON JUDIcIAL
RzvIEW OF DECISION.-The Interstate Commerce Commission issued an order
prescribing divisions, between northern and southern carriers, of through
rates on citrus fruit from Florida points to destinations in official classifi-
cation territory. The northern carriers sued in equity to enjoin, set aside,
and annul these orders on the ground that the prescribed divisions were
confiscatory. The court dismissed the petitions but in so doing, held, that
in considering the issue of confiscation the court is not limited to evidence
introduced before the Commission. It entertained additional evidence upon
this issue. Baltimore and Ohio Ry. v. United States, (D. C. E. D. Va.
1934) 9 Fed. Supp. 181.
Though at first, in accordance with the Statute, (24 Stat. 384, [1887], 49
U. S. C. A. 16) the Supreme Court gave to the findings of fact by the
Commission the effect only of prima facie evidence, I. C. C. v. Ala. Midland
R. Co. (1897) 164 U. S. 144, it stressed the importance of having all the
facts disclosed before the Commission and expressly disapproved any method
of procedure on the part of the railroads which led them to withhold part
of their evidence from the Commission and to produce it for the first time
in the courts. Cin., N. 0. & Tex. Pac. B. v. L C. C. (1896) 162 U. S. 184,
196; Texas & P. R. Co. v. I. C. C. (1896) 162 U. S. 197. As cases became in-
creasingly numerous the courts realized more and more the expediency of
having the Commission pass upon the intricate questions of fact. The Hep-
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